The three military-led governments of Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger have spent the past two years building one of the most consequential geopolitical projects in modern West Africa: the Alliance of Sahel States, known by its French acronym AES. What began as a mutual-defence pact in 2023 has hardened into a confederation that has broken with the region's main bloc and started building parallel institutions of its own.
From defence pact to confederation
The Alliance was first announced in late 2023 as a response to a shared threat environment. All three states face long-running insurgencies linked to groups affiliated with al-Qaeda and the Islamic State, and all three are governed by leaders who came to power through military takeovers. Faced with external pressure and the threat of intervention, they chose to bind themselves together.
By 2024 the partnership had been formally upgraded into a confederation, signalling an intent to coordinate not only on defence but on economic and diplomatic policy. The shift marked a clear break from the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), the long-standing regional bloc the three governments accuse of being too close to former colonial power France and too quick to impose sanctions.
A clean break with ECOWAS
The most visible consequence of the confederation has been the formal departure of all three countries from ECOWAS. For decades, ECOWAS represented the dominant framework for regional integration in West Africa, governing trade, free movement and collective security. The withdrawal of three contiguous Sahelian states tears a hole in that framework and raises hard questions about cross-border trade, customs and the freedom of movement that millions of people in the region have relied on.
For ordinary citizens, the practical effects are still unfolding. Traders, migrants and families with relatives across borders now face a more uncertain legal landscape, even as the AES governments insist they will preserve free movement among their own members.
Building parallel institutions
What distinguishes the AES from a simple protest against ECOWAS is its effort to construct alternatives. The bloc has moved to create a joint military force intended to pool resources against insurgent groups operating across their shared frontiers, an acknowledgement that none of the three can secure its territory alone.
On the economic side, the confederation has established a development and investment bank to serve as its financial arm, capitalised to fund infrastructure and cross-border projects. The members have also floated longer-term ambitions, including discussion of a common passport and eventually a shared currency that would reduce reliance on the CFA franc framework.
A deepening security crisis
The political project is unfolding against a brutal security backdrop. The central Sahel remains one of the most violent regions in the world, with millions of people internally displaced and large rural areas effectively outside government control. Insurgent groups have grown more capable, in some cases capturing military equipment and contesting supply routes.
The departure of French forces and the arrival of Russian-linked security contractors has reshaped the external footprint in the region, but it has not resolved the underlying conflict. Analysts caution that institution-building on paper means little if the security situation on the ground continues to deteriorate.
Why it matters beyond the Sahel
The AES experiment is being watched far beyond West Africa. It represents a test case for whether a group of states can exit a major regional bloc and build credible alternatives, and it sits at the centre of a broader contest for influence in Africa involving Western powers, Russia and other outside actors.
For Europe, the stakes include migration and counterterrorism cooperation along routes that pass through the Sahel toward the Mediterranean. For West Africa, the question is whether the region fractures into competing blocs or finds a new equilibrium that keeps trade and movement alive despite political divisions.
The road ahead
The Alliance of Sahel States is still a young project, and its durability is far from guaranteed. Much depends on whether the confederation can deliver tangible improvements in security and living standards, or whether the weight of insurgency, displacement and economic isolation overwhelms its ambitions. What is already clear is that the political map of West Africa has shifted, and the assumptions that governed regional integration for a generation can no longer be taken for granted.